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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Plaintiff Humana Medical Plan, Inc. and Humana 
Insurance Company (collectively, “Humana”) brought suit 
against GlaxoSmithKline, L.L.C. and GlaxoSmithKline plc 
(collectively, “Glaxo”) alleging that Glaxo was obligated to 
reimburse Humana for expenses Humana had incurred 
treating its insureds’ injuries resulting from Glaxo’s drug, 
Avandia.  Humana runs a Medicare Advantage plan.  Its 
complaint asserts that, pursuant to the Medicare Act, Glaxo is 
in this instance a “primary payer” obligated to reimburse 
Humana as a “secondary payer.”  The District Court 
dismissed the action, agreeing with Glaxo that the Medicare 
Act did not provide Medicare Advantage organizations 
(“MAOs”) with a private cause of action to seek such 
reimbursement.  Humana filed a timely appeal.   
 The Medicare Secondary Payer Act, in 42 U.S.C. § 
1395y(b)(3)(A),  provides Humana with a private cause of 
action against Glaxo.  Even if we were to find, as Appellees 
suggest, that this provision is ambiguous, we would 
nonetheless be required to defer to regulations issued by the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”).  The 
regulations make clear that the provision extends the private 
cause of action to MAOs.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
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 Glaxo manufactures and distributes Avandia, a Type 2 
diabetes drug that has been linked to substantially increased 
risk of heart attack and stroke.  Thousands of Avandia 
patients have alleged various injuries resulting from their use 
of the drug and Glaxo has begun entering into agreements to 
settle these claims.1
 While most Medicare-eligible individuals receive 
Medicare benefits directly from the government, individuals 
can elect instead to receive their benefits through private 
insurance companies that contract with the government to 
provide “Medicare Advantage” (“MA”) plans.  42 U.S.C. § 
1395w-21(a)(1).  Glaxo has not, to date, included 
reimbursement of MA plans in the settlement agreements that 
it has reached with Avandia claimants enrolled in MA plans, 
although MAOs have paid the costs of treatment of Avandia-
related injuries for these claimants.
  As part of the settlement process, where 
the claimant is insured by Medicare, Glaxo sets aside reserves 
to reimburse the Medicare Trust Fund for payments it made 
to cover the costs of treatment for the claimants’ Avandia-
related injuries.   
2
                                              
1 By August 2011, when Appellants filed their brief, Glaxo 
had paid more than $460 million to settle these claims. 
  Humana’s MA plan 
provides benefits to approximately one million people, and 
2 An MA plan assumes full responsibility for paying the 
medical costs of its plan participants in exchange for a fixed 
annual per-participant payment from the government.  
§ 1395w-23.  This fixed, or “capitated,” amount is calculated 
annually using a formula based on the cost of providing the 
required benefits that would otherwise be covered by 
traditional Medicare.  Id. 
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Humana filed this lawsuit to seek reimbursement from Glaxo 
for the costs of treating its enrollees’ Avandia-related injuries.   
 On November 17, 2010, Humana filed its class action 
complaint in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.3
 On December 23, 2010, Glaxo filed a motion to 
dismiss.  The District Court heard oral argument on the 
motion and, on June 13, 2011, granted it.  In dismissing the 
action, the District Court noted that Part C of the Medicare 
Act (the “Medicare Advantage” or “MA” statute) contains its 
own secondary payer provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(a)(4).  
In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liability 
Litig., 2011 WL 2413488, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2011).  
The District Court observed that this provision references the 
MSP Act without fully adopting or incorporating it and that 
its language is permissive, whereas the language of the MSP 
Act is mandatory.  Id.  Given the existence of the MA 
statute’s provision, specifically relevant to MAOs, the District 
Court held that the private cause of action within the MSP 
  Humana 
sought, on behalf of itself and a class of similarly-situated 
MAOs: (1) damages under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act 
(“MSP Act”), which provides a private cause of action, 42 
U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A), allowing double damages for failure 
to reimburse a secondary payer; and (2) equitable relief in the 
form of an order compelling Glaxo to identify settling 
Avandia claimants to the MAOs that cover them.       
                                              
3 Many suits alleging Avandia-related injuries have been filed 
in federal court and almost all are being coordinated for 
pretrial purposes in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  In 
re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability 
Litigation, MDL Dkt. No. 1871.  This case is among them.   
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Act did not apply to MAOs, nor did the secondary payer 
provision in the MA statute create a private right of action for 
MAOs.  Id. at *4.  Next, the District Court analyzed whether 
an implied private right of action for Humana existed 
according to the four-part test laid out by the Supreme Court  
in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).  In re Avandia, 2011 WL 
2413488, at *4.  Although the District Court found that 
Humana met the first prong of the test, as it was a member of 
the class the statute was enacted to benefit, it found that 
Humana failed on the other three prongs: there was no clear 
legislative intent to create a remedy for Humana, it was not 
consistent with the legislative scheme to imply a remedy, and 
the cause of action was one traditionally litigated under state 
law.  Id.  The District Court therefore found that no implied 
private right of action existed.    
 Additionally, the District Court found that the statute’s 
silence on the existence of a private right of action for MAOs 
“does not create ambiguity, but rather indicates [Congress’s] 
intent not to create a private right of action for MAOs.”  Id. at 
*5.  With no ambiguity in the plain text of the statute, the 
District Court held that the judicial deference to duly-enacted 
regulations required by Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984), did not come into play.  Accordingly, the Court did 
not defer to the CMS regulation that granted MAOs parity 
with Medicare vis-à-vis recovery from primary payers, see 42 
C.F.R. § 422.108(f).  In re Avandia, 2011 WL 2413488, at *5. 
 Finally, Humana sought an order from the District 
Court ordering Glaxo to disclose information about 
settlements that Humana’s enrollees entered into with Glaxo.   
The District Court declined to grant Humana the equitable 
relief it sought.  It found that Humana, and not Glaxo, had 
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access to information about which Avandia claimants were 
enrolled in Humana’s MA plan and that Humana could use 
this information to remind claimants of their obligation to 
disclose any settlement they might reach with Glaxo.4, 5
 Humana filed a timely Notice of Appeal.  Humana 
asks this Court to determine whether the District Court erred 
in holding that the private cause of action in the MSP Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A), did not provide Humana with a 
cause of action here.  America’s Health Insurance Plans, 
representing the health insurance industry, filed an amicus 
brief in support of Humana.   
      Id.  
II. 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because interpretation of the 
federal Medicare Act presents a federal question.  This Court 
has appellate jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review de novo the decision of a district court granting a 
motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  McTernan v. 
City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009).  In ruling 
upon a motion to dismiss, “all well-pleaded allegations of the 
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW    
                                              
4 The District Court also noted that a pending amendment to 
the MSP Act might arguably shift the reporting burden to 
Glaxo, but declined to address that question because it was 
not yet ripe.  In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. 
Liability Litig., 2011 WL 2413488, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 
2011).   
5 Humana did not appeal the District Court’s dismissal of its 
claim for equitable relief.  
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complaint must be taken as true and interpreted in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs, and all inferences must be 
drawn in favor of them.”  Id.  (quoting Schrob v. Catterson, 
948 F.2d 1402, 1408 (3d Cir.1991)). 
III. 
  Humana asks this Court to determine whether the 
private cause of action for double damages created by the 
Medicare Secondary Payer Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A), 
provides it and other MAOs with the right to bring suit. 
ANALYSIS 
6  We 
find that the plain text of the provision sweeps broadly 
enough to include MAOs and that, even if we determined the 
statute to be ambiguous on this point, deference to CMS 
regulations7
A. The Medicare Statute 
 would require us to find that MAOs have the 
same right to recover as the Medicare Trust Fund does.  We 
will therefore reverse the decision of the District Court.     
 Subchapter XVIII of Chapter 7 of Title 42 of the 
United States Code is entitled “Health Insurance for Aged and 
Disabled,” and is more commonly known as the Medicare 
                                              
6 Humana repeatedly states that an MAO has “standing” to 
bring suit under the provision at issue.  In order to avoid 
confusion with the doctrine of constitutional standing, see 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992), 
this opinion avoids that term.   
7 CMS is an operating division within the Department of 
Health & Human Services which issues Medicare-related 
regulations on behalf of the Secretary of Health & Human 
Services.   
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Statute.  42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 to 1395kkk-1.  The Medicare 
Statute divides benefits into four parts.  Part A, “Hospital 
Insurance Benefits for Aged and Disabled,” and Part B, 
“Supplementary Medical Benefits for Aged and Disabled,” 
create, describe, and regulate traditional fee-for-service, 
government-administered Medicare.  §§ 1395c to 1395i-5; §§ 
1395-j to 1395w-5.  Part C, inserted with the passage of the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, creates the 
program now known as Medicare Advantage, which allows 
for the creation of MA plans and is described in detail below.  
§ 1395w-21 to -29.  Finally, Part D provides for prescription 
drug coverage for Medicare enrollees.  § 1395w-101 to -154.   
 Part C allows Medicare enrollees to obtain their 
Medicare benefits through private insurers (MAOs) instead of 
receiving direct benefits from the government under Parts A 
and B.  § 1395w-21(a).  CMS pays an MAO a fixed amount 
for each enrollee, per capita (a “capitation”).  The MAO then 
administers Medicare benefits for those enrollees and 
assumes the risk associated with insuring them.  MAOs like 
Humana are thus responsible for paying covered medical 
expenses for their enrollees.  Part C allows MAOs some 
flexibility as to the design of their MA plans.  The MAO is 
required to provide the benefits covered under Parts A and B 
to enrollees, but it may also provide additional benefits to its 
enrollees.  § 1395w-22(a)(1)-(3).   
 Part C also includes one of the two provisions that lie 
at the heart of this case.  Entitled “Organization as secondary 
payer,” this provision states: 
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Notwithstanding any other provision of law, [an 
MAO]8
(A) the insurance carrier, employer, or other 
entity which under such law, plan, or policy is 
to pay for the provision of such services, or 
 may (in the case of the provision of 
items and services to an individual under [an 
MA] plan under circumstances in which 
payment under this title is made secondary 
pursuant to section 1395y(b)(2)) of this title 
charge or authorize the provider of such 
services to charge, in accordance with the 
charges allowed under a law, plan, or policy 
described in such section-- 
(B) such individual to the extent that the 
individual has been paid under such law, plan, 
or policy for such services. 
  § 1395w-22(a)(4) (the “MAO secondary payer provision”). 
                                              
8 The statutory text refers to MAOs as “Medicare+Choice” 
organizations.  For simplicity’s sake, this opinion substitutes 
the contemporary terminology wherever that phrase appears. 
See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2176, 
42 U.S.C. §1395w-21 note  (“[T]he Secretary shall provide 
for an appropriate transition in the use of the terms 
‘Medicare+Choice’ and ‘Medicare Advantage’ (or ‘MA’) in 
reference to the program under part C of title XVIII of the 
Social Security Act.”).   
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 This provision (the “Part C secondary payer 
provision”) cross-references § 1395y(b)(2) for its definitions 
of primary payers and its positioning of Medicare as a 
secondary payer.  That cross-referenced provision is located 
within § 1395y(b), the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, 
enacted in 1980.  It provides that Medicare cannot pay 
medical expenses where “payment has been made or can 
reasonably be expected to be made under a workmen’s 
compensation law or plan of the United States or a State or 
under an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan 
(including a self-insured plan) or under no fault insurance.”  § 
1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii).  Further, a business “shall be deemed to 
have a self-insured plan if it carries its own risk (whether by a 
failure to obtain insurance, or otherwise) in whole or in part.”  
Id.  Glaxo, which pays out of its own pocket to settle the 
Avandia-related claims, is self-insured and therefore a 
primary payer in this instance.  
 The MSP Act also gives the Secretary the authority to 
make “conditional payments” in circumstances where a 
primary payer is actually responsible for the cost of medical 
treatment but “has not made or cannot reasonably be expected 
to make payment with respect to such item or service 
promptly.”  § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i).  In such a circumstance, the 
primary plan must subsequently reimburse the Medicare Trust 
Fund.  § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii).  If the primary plan fails to 
reimburse the Fund, “the United States may bring an action 
against any or all entities that are or were required or 
responsible . . . to make payment . . . under a primary plan.”  
§ 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii).  The government may then collect 
double damages, “in accordance with paragraph (3)(A).”  Id.   
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 Paragraph (3)(A) (the “MSP private cause of action 
provision”) is the other provision central to this case.  It 
states: 
There is established a private cause of action for 
damages (which shall be in an amount double 
the amount otherwise provided) in the case of a 
primary plan which fails to provide for primary 
payment (or appropriate reimbursement) in 
accordance with [the requirements of the MSP 
Act].  
§ 1395y(b)(3)(A).   
 The Medicare Statute thus creates two separate causes 
of action allowing for recovery of double damages where a 
primary payer fails to cover the costs of medical treatment.  
When the Medicare Trust Fund makes a conditional payment 
and the primary payer does not reimburse it, the United States 
may bring suit pursuant to § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii).  
Additionally, a private cause of action with no particular 
plaintiff specified exists pursuant to § 1395y(b)(3)(A) 
anytime a primary payer fails to make required payments.9
                                              
9 Although the MSP private cause of action provision sweeps 
broadly, it is not so broad that it can function as a qui tam 
statute, allowing a private party to bring suit as an agent of 
the government to collect moneys owed to the government.  
Each of our sister circuits to have considered the question has 
rejected this interpretation.  Woods v. Empire Health, 574 
F.3d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 2009); Stalley ex rel. United States v. 
Orland Reg. Healthcare System, Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1234 
(11th Cir. 2008); Stalley v. Methodist Healthcare, 517 F.3d 
911, 919 (6th Cir. 2008); Stalley v. Catholic Health 
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Exactly how broadly this latter provision sweeps will 
determine the outcome of this appeal.   
B. Textual Arguments 
 
1. 
 The plain text of the MSP private cause of action lends 
itself to Humana’s position that any private party may bring 
an action under that provision.  It establishes “a private cause 
of action for damages” and places no additional limitations on 
which private parties may bring suit.  § 1395y(b)(3)(A).  
Accordingly, we find that the provision is broad and 
unambiguous, placing no limitations upon which private (i.e., 
non-governmental) actors can bring suit for double damages 
when a primary plan fails to appropriately reimburse any 
secondary payer.   
MSP Private Cause of Action Provision 
 Glaxo presents no argument that undermines this 
facially clear reading.  The MSP private cause of action 
provision allows for damages where the primary plan has 
failed to pay “in accordance with paragraphs (1) and (2)(A).”  
Id.  Paragraph (2)(A), in turn, consistently refers to payments 
“under this subchapter.”10
                                                                                                     
Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 527 (8th Cir. 2007); United Seniors 
Ass’n v. Philip Morris USA, 500 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2007).   
  § 1395y(b)(2)(A).  Glaxo contends 
that “payments under this subchapter” refers to payments 
10 The United States Code Service uses the word “title” in 
place of “subchapter,” favored by the United States Code 
Annotated.  This opinion utilizes the statutory text from the 
latter compilation.     
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made by the Medicare Trust Fund and excludes payments 
from the MAO to private entities, which are instead “made 
pursuant to private contracts of insurance between the MAO 
and the participant.”  (Id. at 25.)   
 In contrast, Humana argues that because “subchapter” 
refers to the Medicare Act as a whole, and not in particular to 
Parts A or B under which the government provides benefits 
directly to enrollees, payments made by private providers 
under Parts C or D are also covered.  Humana supports this 
assertion by highlighting other places in the Medicare Act 
where Congress intentionally limited the applicability of a 
provision to payments made under particular Parts of the 
Medicare Act.  (Appellants’ Br. 23.)  These provisions refer 
specifically to “payment made under part A or part B of this 
subchapter,” § 1395y(a), or payment made “under Part B of 
this subchapter,” § 1395y(c).  See also § 1395y(f) (requiring 
Secretary to establish guidelines as to whether payment may 
be made for certain expenses “under part A or part B of this 
subchapter”).   
 This language makes clear that “subchapter” refers to 
the Medicare Act as a whole.  Since the MSP Act and its 
private cause of action provision do not attach any narrowing 
language to “payments made under this subchapter,” that 
phrase applies to payments made under Part C as well as 
those made under Parts A and B.  Accordingly, that language 
cannot be read to exclude MAOs from the ambit of the 
private cause of action provision.     
 It is worth noting that, although the MSP Act was 
enacted before Part C, which created MAOs, private 
Medicare risk plans were authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 
1395mm in 1972, before the passage of the MSP Act.  Act of 
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Oct. 30, 1972, sec. 226(a), Pub. L. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1396.  
Thus, at the time it enacted the MSP Act, Congress was aware 
that private Medicare providers existed.  Had it intended to 
prevent them from suing under the private cause of action 
provision, Congress could have done so explicitly.   
2. 
 Glaxo raises a number of arguments stemming from its 
contention that the MSP private cause of action provision 
cannot be read in a vacuum.  Glaxo urges this Court to 
analyze the relationship between MAOs and the MSP Act by 
beginning with the MAO secondary payer provision.  The 
plain text of the MAO secondary payer provision, Glaxo 
avers, makes clear that MAOs do not have a federal cause of 
action anywhere under the Medicare Act.  Further, because 
this provision specifically defines the relationship of MAOs 
to secondary payer status and the MSP Act, it controls those 
relationships, and the MSP private cause of action does not 
apply to MAOs. 
MAO Secondary Payer Provision  
11
 In Glaxo’s argument, the MAO secondary payer 
provision, by stating that an MAO “may . . . charge or 
authorize the provider of [ ] services to charge” the primary 
payer, gives MAOs the right to include in their policy 
   
                                              
11 Humana has not raised on appeal the question of whether 
there is some private right of action for MAOs implied in the 
Medicare Act, although the District Court found that no such 
implied right of action exists.  2011 WL 2413488, at *4.  
Accordingly, we are asked to determine whether the text of § 
1395y(b)(3)(A) provides Humana with a cause of action and 
nothing further.  
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contracts provisions making them secondary payers in 
situations in which a primary payer would be liable under the 
MSP Act.  § 1395w-22(a)(4).  It does not, however, provide a 
federal remedy for the enforcement of that right.  See 
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (stating that 
statute does not create private cause of action unless Congress 
intended “to create not just a private right but also a private 
remedy”).  At oral argument, Glaxo asserted that this 
provision was intended to preempt state law that could 
preclude an MAO from positioning itself as a secondary 
payer, as certain personal injury laws might.    
 Under the interpretation urged by Glaxo, no rights to 
reimbursement are granted to an MAO by the Medicare Act.  
Instead, such rights can be secured by the MAO’s contract 
with an individual insured; that is, the insurance policy.  This 
policy may define an MAO as a secondary payer, according 
to the definition contained in the MSP Act, and it may also 
contain rights of reimbursement and subrogation.12
 The District Court accepted this interpretation of the 
MAO secondary payer provision.  2011 WL 2413488, at *4; 
  Then, if a 
primary payer were to fail to reimburse the MAO, the MAO 
could sue to enforce its contractual rights in state court.  It 
could be made whole either by recovering from the primary 
payer through subrogation or, if the insured has received 
payment from the primary payer, from the insured directly.   
                                              
12 As the District Court noted, the policy might also create an 
obligation for the insured to inform the MAO of any primary 
insurance coverage, including tort settlements where the 
tortfeasor qualifies as a primary payer.  In re Avandia, 2011 
WL 2413488, at *4 n.40.   
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see also Parra v. PacifiCare of Arizona, Inc., Civ. No. 10-
008, 2011 WL 1119736 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2011) (finding 
Congress did no more than provide MAOs with “right to 
charge and/or bill a beneficiary for reimbursement, 
notwithstanding and [sic] state law or regulation to the 
contrary” ).  It is important to remember, though, that 
Humana does not contend that § 1395w-22(a)(4) endows it 
with a private right of action.  Instead, it hangs its hat entirely 
on the MSP Act provision.  Thus, § 1395w-22(a)(4) is 
relevant only inasmuch as it assists us in interpreting the MSP 
private cause of action provision, and we are not persuaded 
that it undermines the meaning of the plain text of that 
provision.   
 Glaxo further contends that the reference to § 
1395y(b)(2) in the MAO secondary payer provision, far from 
incorporating the entirety of the MSP Act into Part C, in fact 
makes clear that only the definition of a primary payer from 
the MSP Act is incorporated there.  (Appellees’ Br. 21-22.)  
This argument is unavailing for the same reason—Humana is 
not arguing that the MAO secondary payer provision provides 
a cause of action through its reference to the MSP Act, but 
that the language of the MSP private cause of action is itself 
broad enough to encompass an MAO such as Humana, 
regardless of the existence of § 1395w-22(a)(4).  In order to 
find these arguments persuasive, we would need to determine 
that, although private insurers providing Medicaid services 
could have brought suit under the MSP private cause of 
action provision before the enactment of the MA secondary 
payer provision, once that text became law, the MSP private 
cause of action was closed to them.  We will not reach this 
conclusion. 
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 Glaxo’s final argument based on the text of the MAO 
secondary payer provision is that the permissive nature of the 
language there (an MAO “may” charge a primary plan), in 
contrast to the mandatory nature of the language in the MSP 
Act (“Payment under this subchapter may not be made. . .”) 
means that MAOs cannot be authorized to bring suit under 
the MSP private cause of action.  § 1395w-22(a)(4); § 
1395y(b)(2)(A).  Glaxo reads far too much into this 
distinction.  No MAO, acting rationally, would decline to 
position itself as a secondary payer in order to charge primary 
payers where appropriate.  Accordingly, the fact that 
Congress employs permissive language when establishing 
rules for private, market-driven entities and mandatory 
language when creating rules for the Secretary, a federal 
official over whom Congress exercises control, has no effect 
on the proper interpretation of MSP private cause of action.   
 In short, there is nothing in the text or legislative 
history of the MA secondary payer provision that 
demonstrates a congressional intent to deny MAOs access to 
the MSP private cause of action.   
3. 
 None of the decisions cited by Glaxo or the District 
Court provide us with sufficient reason to conclude that, in 
contravention of the plain text of the MSP private cause of 
action provision, an MAO may not bring suit under it.  The 
District Court found that no federal private cause of action 
exists under the MSP Act by relying on two cases, neither of 
which had plaintiffs who made an argument based on the 
MSP Act provision at issue here.   
Court Decisions 
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 In Care Choices HMO v. Engstrom, 330 F.3d 786 (6th 
Cir. 2003), the Sixth Circuit considered the argument of Care 
Choices, a Medicare-substitute HMO, that it had an implied 
federal private right of action allowing it to recover the cost 
of an insured’s medical expenses, where the participant had 
collected damages from the tortfeasor who had injured her.  
That court declined to find an implied private right of action 
in the provision allowing Care Choices to occupy secondary-
payer status.  In so doing, it compared the language of the 
MSP Act private cause of action provision with § 
1395mm(e)(4),13
 Similarly, in Nott v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare Inc., 303 F. 
Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Pa. 2004), the court considered whether § 
1395mm(e)(4) or § 1395w-22(a)(4) created a federal scheme 
for enforcement of a Medicare-substitute HMO’s subrogation 
rights that would completely preempt conflicting state laws.  
The Nott court noted explicitly that § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii), the 
government’s cause of action for reimbursement, was not 
implicated in the case, id. at 570, and it nowhere mentioned 
 finding the contrast to support its holding 
that § 1395mm(e)(4) was not intended to create any private 
right of action.  Id. at 790.  Whether Care Choices could have 
brought suit as a private actor under the MSP Act was neither 
raised nor addressed and thus the decision of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit cannot guide us 
here.   
                                              
13 Because Care Choices was a Medicare-substitute HMO and 
not an MAO, the relevant, private-insurer-specific secondary 
payer provision was not § 1395w-22(a)(4), but rather § 
1395mm(e)(4), which contains nearly identical language.  
The two provisions are logically subject to the same 
interpretation.   
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the § 1395y(b)(3)(A) private cause of action.  Relying 
substantially on Care Choices, it held that “[t]here is no 
federal cause of action created by either subsection” and thus 
no preemption.  Id. at 571.   
 Once again, because the decision does not discuss 
whether a private insurer providing Medicare services can 
bring suit under the MSP private cause of action, it is of 
limited relevance here.14
 In contrast, the decision of the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit in Bio-Medical Applications of Tenn., Inc. v. 
Central States Health and Welfare Fund, 656 F.3d 277 (6th 
Cir. 2011), does specifically consider the MSP private cause 
of action provision.  There, the court held that the 
“demonstrated responsibility” provision of the MSP
 
15
                                              
14 For the same reasons, Parra v. PacifiCare of Arizona, Inc., 
cited by Glaxo and the District Court, is also inapposite.  
2011 WL 1119736 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2011).  This unreported 
decision adopts a magistrate’s report and recommendation 
finding no implied private right of action in the MAO 
secondary payer provision.  The report and recommendation 
relied heavily on Care Choices, and neither that decision nor 
the decision of the district court addressed the argument that 
an MAO could bring suit under the MSP private cause of 
action provision.  
 applied 
15 “A primary plan . . . shall reimburse [the Trust Fund] for 
any payment made by [Medicare] . . . with respect to an item 
or service if it is demonstrated that such primary plan has or 
had a responsibility to make payment with respect to such 
item or service.”  § 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii)  
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only to situations in which the primary payer was a tortfeasor 
and not to the case before it, in which the primary plan was 
actually a primary insurer.  Id. at 290-91.  In explicating this 
point, it noted that a tortfeasor could be held liable as a 
primary payer under the MSP Act only when Medicare sues 
for reimbursement from a primary plan and not when the 
plaintiff is a private party.  Id. at 292-93.  It buttressed this 
distinction between Medicare and private parties with a 
number of arguments from the statute’s text and legislative 
history.16
C. Legislative History and Policy 
  Id.  at 292.  However, the private party bringing 
suit in Bio-Medical was neither an MAO nor a Medicare-
substitute HMO, and the court there did not consider how 
such an entity would fit into the dichotomy it described.  As 
the remainder of this opinion will demonstrate, we believe 
that denying an MAO the rights to recovery provided to 
Medicare would undermine the very purpose of the MA 
program and that Congress did not intend this result.      
 Although we find the text of the statute to be 
unambiguous, we nonetheless include here a discussion of the 
                                              
16 These reasons include, inter alia, that the demonstrated 
responsibility provision’s “text places a condition only on 
when primary plans must reimburse Medicare; it does not 
mention when plans must pay private parties,” that “the 
structure of the Act suggests that the provision is limited to 
the reimbursement of Medicare,” and that “the predominant 
legislative backdrop was Medicare’s (not private parties’) 
failed attempts to bring lawsuits against tortfeasors.”  Bio-
Medical Applications of Tenn., Inc. v. Central States Health 
and Welfare Fund, 656 F.3d 277, 292 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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legislative history and policy rationales that support our 
conclusion. 
 Congress’s goal in creating the Medicare Advantage 
program was to harness the power of private sector 
competition to stimulate experimentation and innovation that 
would ultimately create a more efficient and less expensive 
Medicare system.  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 105-217, at 585 
(1997) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that MA program was intended 
to “enable the Medicare program to utilize innovations that 
have helped the private market contain costs and expand 
health care delivery options”).  It was the belief of Congress 
that the MA program would “continue to grow and eventually 
eclipse original fee-for-service Medicare as the predominant 
form of enrollment under the Medicare program.”  Id. at 638.  
The MA program was thus, like the MSP statute, “designed to 
curb skyrocketing health costs and preserve the fiscal 
integrity of the Medicare system.”  Fanning v. United States, 
346 F.3d 386, 388 (3d Cir. 2003).   
 It would be impossible for MAOs to stimulate 
innovation through competition if they began at a competitive 
disadvantage, and, as CMS has noted, MAOs compete best 
when they recover consistently from primary payers.  Policy 
and Technical Changes to the Medicare Advantage and the 
Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 
19678, 19797 (Apr. 15, 2010).  When they “faithfully pursue 
and recover from liable third parties,” MAOs will have lower 
medical expenses and will therefore be able to provide 
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additional benefits to their enrollees.17
                                              
17 CMS explains this mechanism more fully elsewhere:  
  Id.  If Medicare could 
threaten recalcitrant primary payers with double damages and 
MAOs could not, MAOs would be at a competitive 
We note that MAOs claim expenses related to MSP 
recoveries as part of their administrative overhead. 
MA organizations that faithfully pursue and recover 
from liable third parties will have lower medical 
expenses. Lower medical expenses make such plans 
more attractive to enrollees. The lower the medical 
expenses in an MA plan, the higher the potential 
rebate. The rebate is calculated as the difference 
between the cost of Medicare benefits and the 
benchmark for that plan. The benchmark is a fixed 
amount. Therefore, as the cost of Medicare benefits go 
down (with the benchmark remaining constant), the 
larger the rebate. Therefore, as more MSP dollars are 
collected or avoided, medical expense go down and 
rebates go up, allowing the sponsoring MA 
organization to offer potential enrollees additional 
non-Medicare benefits funded by rebate dollars. Such 
non-Medicare benefits include reductions in cost 
sharing. Since cost sharing is generally expressed as a 
percentage of medical costs, such cost sharing will also 
be proportionally lower as overall medical costs go 
down—providing MA organizations offering such 
plans with an additional competitive edge. 
Policy and Technical Changes to the Medicare Advantage 
and the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Programs, 74 
Fed. Reg. 54634, 54711 (proposed Oct. 22, 2009). 
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disadvantage, unable to exert the same pressure and thus 
forced to expend more resources collecting from such payers.  
It is difficult to believe that it would have been the intent of 
Congress to hamstring MAOs in this manner. 
 Although the legislative history is nowhere explicit 
that MAOs may bring suit for double damages under the MSP 
private cause of action or using any other provision, it does 
make clear that MAOs were intended to enjoy a status 
parallel to that of traditional Medicare: 
Under original fee-for-service, the Federal 
government alone set legislative requirements 
regarding reimbursement, covered providers, 
covered benefits and services, and mechanisms 
for resolving coverage disputes. Therefore, the 
Conferees intend that this legislation provide a 
clear statement extending the same treatment to 
private [MA] plans providing Medicare benefits 
to Medicare beneficiaries. 
H.R. Rep. No. 105-217, at 638.18
 Our sister circuits have determined that the MSP Act 
provides traditional Medicare with a cause of action for 
double damages “[i]n order ‘to facilitate recovery of 
conditional payments.’”  Stalley v. Methodist Healthcare, 517 
   
                                              
18 Because Congress clearly intended there to be parity 
between MAOs and traditional Medicare, we find additional 
support for our decision in § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii), the 
government’s cause of action for recovery from primary 
payers, which also provides for double damages.  
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F.3d 911, 915 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Glover v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006)).  We see 
nothing in the text or legislative history of the statute to imply 
that Congress did not intend to facilitate recovery for MAOs 
in the same fashion.   
 The District Court determined that providing MAOs 
with a right of action would not advance the program’s cost-
savings aim because “payments to the MA from the Medicare 
trust fund are capitated annually, shifting the economic risk of 
excessive medical expenses from the government to the MA 
organization.”  2011 WL 2413488, at *4.  As we have 
explained elsewhere, “[t]he Government pays MA plan 
participants a set amount of money based on the plans’ 
enrollees’ risk factors and other characteristics rather than 
paying them a fee for specific services performed.”  U.S. ex 
rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 300 
n.4 (3d Cir. 2011).  This capitation rate is based in part on the 
“adjusted average per capita cost” to the Medicare Trust Fund 
of covering a traditional Medicare participant in that year.  42 
U.S.C. § 1395w-23(c)(1)(D); § 1395mm(a)(4) (defining 
“adjusted average per capita cost” as “average per capita 
amount that the Secretary estimates in advance . . .would be 
payable in any contract year for services covered under parts 
A and B of this subchapter. . . if services were to be furnished 
by other than an eligible organization”).   
 The District Court’s logic on this point is flawed for 
several reasons.  If an MA plan provides CMS with a bid to 
cover Medicare-eligible individuals for an amount less than 
the benchmark amount calculated by CMS, it must use 
seventy-five percent of that savings to provide additional 
benefits to its enrollees.  42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-24 (b)(1)(C)(i), 
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(b)(3)(C), (b)(4)(C).19  The remaining twenty-five percent of 
the savings is retained by the Medicare Trust Fund.  
Accordingly, when MAOs spend less on providing coverage 
for their enrollees, as they will if they recover efficiently from 
primary payers, the Medicare Trust Fund does achieve cost 
savings.20
                                              
19 The “Beneficiary Rebate Rule” provides in full:  
   
The MA plan shall provide to the enrollee a 
monthly rebate equal to 75 percent (or the 
applicable rebate percentage specified in clause 
(iii) in the case of plan years beginning on or 
after January 1, 2012) of the average per capita 
savings (if any) described in paragraph (3)(C) 
or (4)(C), as applicable to the plan and year 
involved. 
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-24(b)(1)(C)(i).  In 2012, the federal 
government began to retain a larger portion of the savings and 
the rebate proportion became tied to assessments of MAO 
quality.  § 1395w-24(b)(1)(C)(i).   
20 Our decision here unquestionably results in cost savings for 
the Medicare Trust Fund because our holding on the meaning 
of the private cause of action will apply equally to private 
entities that provide prescription drug benefits pursuant to 
Medicare Part D.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-151(b) (requiring 
that provisions relating to the MA program and MAOs be 
read to include part D plans).  Because Part D prescription 
drug plans explicitly share gains and losses with the federal 
government, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-115(e), the Medicare Trust 
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 Further, cost savings for the Medicare Trust Fund was 
not Congress’s only goal when it created the MA program.  
Congress structured the program so that MAOs would 
compete for enrollees based on how efficiently they could 
provide care to Medicare-eligible individuals.  When, by 
recovering from primary payers, MAOs save money, that 
savings results in additional benefits to enrollees not covered 
by traditional Medicare.  Thus, ensuring that MAOs can 
recover from primary payers efficiently with a private cause 
of action for double damages does indeed advance the goals 
of the MA program.      
 We recognize that only Congress can create private 
rights of action and that “[t]he judicial task is to interpret the 
statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays 
an intent to create not just a private right but also a private 
remedy.”  Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 (2001) (citation 
omitted).  The analysis here of text and legislative history lies 
strictly within the bounds of that task.  Our understanding of 
the policy goals of the MA program merely buttresses what 
we have already found in the text of the Medicare Act: MAOs 
are not excluded from bringing suit under the MSP private 
cause of action.  
D. Chevron Deference 
 Although we hold the text of § 1395y(b)(3)(A) to 
unambiguously provide Humana with a private cause of 
action, we recognize that a declaration that the language of 
the Medicare Act is clear may be counterintuitive.  After all, 
                                                                                                     
Fund unquestionably loses money if these private entities 
recover less from primary payers.    
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the Medicare Act has been described as among “the most 
completely impenetrable texts within human experience.”  
Cooper Univ. Hosp. v. Sebelius, 636 F.3d 44 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Rehab. Ass'n of Va., Inc. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 
1450 (4th Cir. 1994)).  We therefore find that, even if the 
statute’s text were deemed to be ambiguous, we would apply 
Chevron deference and would reach the same conclusion.   
 The Supreme Court in Chevron established a two-part 
test for determining when a federal court ought to defer to the 
interpretation of a statute embodied in a regulation formally 
enacted by the federal agency charged with implementing that 
statute.  467 U.S. at 842-43.  First, the court must determine 
whether Congress’s intent on the issue is clear — if so, it 
must abide by that intention, regardless of any regulations.  If 
the statute is unclear, that is, “silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”  Id.  at 843.  We defer to the 
agency’s regulations “unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Id. at 844.  
 CMS “has the congressional authority to promulgate 
rules and regulations interpreting and implementing 
Medicare-related statutes.”  Torretti v. Main Line Hosps., 
Inc., 580 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2009); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§1395hh(a)(1) (“The Secretary shall prescribe such 
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the 
administration of the insurance programs under this 
subchapter.”); 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(1) (“The Secretary 
shall establish by regulation [ ] standards . . . for [MA] 
organizations and plans consistent with, and to carry out, this 
part.”).  Thus, we must accord Chevron deference to 
regulations promulgated by CMS.   
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 CMS regulations state that an “MA organization will 
exercise the same rights to recover from a primary plan, 
entity, or individual that the Secretary exercises under the 
MSP regulations in subparts B through D of part 411 of this 
chapter.”  42 C.F.R. § 422.108.  The plain language of this 
regulation suggests that the Medicare Act treats MAOs the 
same way it treats the Medicare Trust Fund for purposes of 
recovery from any primary payer.  In this circumstance, we 
are bound to defer to the duly-promulgated regulation of 
CMS.   
 Later CMS statements lend further support to this 
understanding of the rule.  In attempting to predict the savings 
generated for MAOs as a result of their secondary payer 
status, CMS “assume[d] a similar MSP rate for MA enrollees 
as obtains in original Medicare.”  Policy and Techinical 
Changes to the Medicare Advantage and the Medicare 
Prescription Drug Benefit Programs, 74 Fed. Reg. 54634, 
54711 (proposed Oct. 22, 2009).  If MAOs lacked the 
recovery mechanism available to “original” Medicare, this 
assumption would be facially invalid.   
 Additionally, a recent memorandum from CMS 
specifically responded to decisions of the federal courts 
holding that MAOs were not “able to take private action to 
collection for [MSP] services under Federal law because they 
have been limited to seeking remedy in State court.”  Ctrs. for 
Medicare & Medicaid Svcs., Dep’t of Health and Human 
Svcs.   Memorandum: Medicare Secondary Payment 
Subrogation Rights (Dec. 5, 2011).  This memorandum 
clarified that CMS itself understood § 422.108 to assign 
MAOs “the right (and responsibility) to collect” from primary 
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payers using the same procedures available to traditional 
Medicare.21
 Glaxo argues that this regulation does not directly 
interpret the MSP private cause of action because the 
Secretary exercises the right to recover pursuant to § 
1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii), which allows the United States to “bring 
an action against any or all entities that are or were required 
or responsible . . . to make payment . . . under a primary 
plan.”  The government may then collect double damages, “in 
accordance with paragraph (3)(A),” the MSP private cause of 
action.  Id.  Glaxo’s logic suggests that the regulation would 
allow MAOs to exercise rights to recovery under the 
government’s cause of action, contrary to the plain language 
of the statute.  However, given the cross-reference within § 
1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii), the statute itself equates the United 
States’ right to recover with a private party’s right to recover.  
Thus, the regulation refers, ultimately, to the private cause of 
action in § 1395y(b)(3)(A) and deference to it supports 
Humana’s right to bring suit under that provision.   
  Id.   
IV. 
 The language of the MSP private cause of action is 
broad and unrestricted and therefore allows any private 
plaintiff with standing to bring an action.
CONCLUSION 
22
                                              
21 The memorandum also noted that these same rights, 
responsibilities, and procedures apply to Part D prescription 
drug plan sponsors via 42 C.F.R. § 423.462.   
  Since private 
22 Because we find that Humana had the right to sue in federal 
court pursuant to § 1395y(b)(3)(A), we need not address its 
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health plans delivered Medicare services prior to the 1980 
passage of the MSP Act, Congress was certainly aware that 
private health plans might be interested private parties when it 
drafted the cause of action, and it did not exclude them from 
that provision’s ambit.  That decision is logically consistent 
because affording MAOs access to the private cause of action 
for double damages comports with the broader policy goals of 
the MA program.  Further, even if we were to find the 
statutory text to be ambiguous on the issue, Chevron 
deference to CMS regulations, which grant MAOs parity with 
traditional Medicare, would require us to find in favor of 
Humana here.   
 For all these reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s dismissal of the complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
                                                                                                     
argument that the District Court also had jurisdiction pursuant 
to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).   
